2019śr11wrz11:0011:30How moral perception is possibledr Artur Szutta (Uniwersytet Gdański)11:00 - 11:30 CTW-102 (Centrum Transferu Wiedzy) organizator: Sekcja Gości Zagranicznych/Foreign Guest Section
"My presentation focuses on the possibility of moral perception. The difficulty is that moral facts seem different from all the usual things that we see, hear, smell, touch, or taste.
“My presentation focuses on the possibility of moral perception. The difficulty is that moral facts seem different from all the usual things that we see, hear, smell, touch, or taste. Objects detected by usual perception seem to be somewhat more real, out there, waiting to be touched or smelled while things like moral goodness or evilness are somewhat queer, hard to be identified within our sight, or hearing experience, even though we have (at least some of us sometimes do) this irresistible impression that we are witnessing something of moral value.
To answer the question of the possibility of moral perception, I will take the following steps. I will firstly present a paradigmatic example of moral perception; then, shortly, outline essential characteristics of perception in general. My next step will be to compare the example with the list of these essential elements. It will allow me to identify certain difficulties the advocates of moral perception need to overcome. I will then present what I believe to be the most sophisticated proposal of moral perception. Such view is based on the assumption that the reality contains more than just mere physical facts. They are the most fundamental facts but not the only ones. Reality is composed of various ontological layers, where lower layers constitute higher ones. Higher level properties (including moral properties) can be perceptually perceived in virtue of the perception of the lower-layer entities.
This idea of more sophisticated moral perception seems to overcome most objections. I am going, however, to formulate another, new objection, called here second life objection, which shows, as I believe, that moral facts are not observable from the third person’s perspective. I do not want to claim, however, that moral perception is not possible at all. The last section of the presentation offers something which could be called moral perception. It would be possible, however, merely from a first person perspective.
Sekcja Gości Zagranicznych/Foreign Guest SectionPrzewodnicząca Sekcji: dr hab. Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, prof. KUL
Sekretarz Sekcji: mgr Marcin Grabowski (KUL)