2019śr11wrz12:4513:15Heuristics vs. Philosophical Problems: Is There Always a Rational Solution to Everything?mgr Tommaso Ostillio (Uniwersytet Warszawski), mgr Michał Bukat (Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego)12:45 - 13:15 CTW-102 (Centrum Transferu Wiedzy) organizator: Sekcja Gości Zagranicznych/Foreign Guest Section
This paper sides with those authors who propose that the Trolley Problem (TP) cannot be solved only with arguments, but requires thorough empirical investigation. The reason why we side with
This paper sides with those authors who propose that the Trolley Problem (TP) cannot be solved only with arguments, but requires thorough empirical investigation. The reason why we side with the latter claim is that arguments seem to decontextualise TP from human impulsivity in decisions under uncertainty. That is, we believe that it cannot be easily argued that there exists an argument or a moral theory, which fits all the possible cases TP applies to.
In order to prove our claim, we take great inspiration from the existing literature on the empirical investigations of TP. In particular, our paper sides with those authors who claim that cognitive biases might spoil individual moral evaluations in defined contexts. Thus, we devise and implement surveys focused on showing that the individual evaluations of the TP are affected by at least three factors: by the fact that the consequences for decision-makers are clearly stated; by the fact that outcomes might be only probable; and by the presence of stereotypes that trigger emotional arousals.
In the very same way, we show that the Knobe Effect (KE) does not hold in contexts with probable outcomes and is highly sensitive to the availability heuristic bias. More specifically, we present two main findings from three empirical tests carried out between 2016 and 2018: the first finding concerns the fact that if the issuer of a decision with consequences on third parties is unlikely to be perceived as unfriendly, then KE is reduced or absent; the second finding regards instead the fact that if an action has two possible outcomes (one likely to obtain with strong intensity and one likely to obtain with less intensity), then KE does not obtain for decisions whose side-effects have limited consequences on third parties.
On this basis, we conclude that neither philosophical dilemmas like TP nor the findings of experimental philosophy like KE survive the test for biased judgement because context unavoidably affects judgement.
Sekcja Gości Zagranicznych/Foreign Guest SectionPrzewodnicząca Sekcji: dr hab. Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, prof. KUL
Sekretarz Sekcji: mgr Marcin Grabowski (KUL)