2019wt10wrz18:4519:15Aristotle on Deliberation and NecessitarianismDr Takashi Oki (Nagoya University, JSPS Research Fellow)18:45 - 19:15 CTW-102 (Centrum Transferu Wiedzy) organizator: Sekcja Gości Zagranicznych/Foreign Guest Section
The problem of compatibility/incompatibility between the possibility of meaningful deliberation and necessitarianism (the view that everything happens of necessity) has long been a topic of discussion, and it is well
The problem of compatibility/incompatibility between the possibility of meaningful deliberation and necessitarianism (the view that everything happens of necessity) has long been a topic of discussion, and it is well known that Aristotle is concerned with the problem in De Interpretatione 9. He thinks that if everything happens of necessity (18b30-31), then ‘there would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, thinking that if we do this, this will happen, but if we do not, it will not’ (18b31-33). In this paper, I argue that Aristotle is a deliberation incompatibilist, and consider why he thinks that it is reasonable to endorse this position.
First, while interpreting his presentation of the necessitarian argument (18a34-18b16) as a reductio (pace Bobzien 2011; Nielsen 2011), I show that Aristotle thinks that deliberation is inefficacious if the future is necessary (in the sense of being fixed/irrevocable) in the way the past and present are.
Second, I argue that the necessitarian conclusion that ‘everything is and happens of necessity’ (18b30-31), which is considered to be incompatible with deliberation, should be distinguished from the view that everything that happens happens of necessity, independently of antecedent conditions (pace Nielsen 2011). Further, I also show that Aristotle’s argument on the inefficaciousness of deliberation is not a sort of ‘Lazy Argument’ (pace Sorabji 1980).
Third, I argue that, in Aristotle’s view, the principle that ‘if we do this, this will happen, but if we do not, it will not’ (18b32-33) would hold even if everything happens of necessity. By pointing out that Aristotle accepts that one could still ‘causally affect some future events’ even if everything happens of necessity, I show that Fine’s (1984) contention that ‘since one can causally affect some future events, one can deliberate about them’ misses the point.
Sekcja Gości Zagranicznych/Foreign Guest SectionPrzewodnicząca Sekcji: dr hab. Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, prof. KUL
Sekretarz Sekcji: mgr Marcin Grabowski (KUL)