wt10wrz10:3011:00Absolutism, Relativism and Semantic Theory of Truthprof. dr hab. Jan Woleński (Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania w Rzeszowie)10:30 - 11:00 CTW-102 (Centrum Transferu Wiedzy) organizator: Sekcja Gości Zagranicznych/Foreign Guest Section
In 1900 Kazimierz Twardowski published a paper „On So-Called Relative Truths”. He argued that the concept of relative truth is not acceptable. Twardowski’s paper became one of the most influential
In 1900 Kazimierz Twardowski published a paper „On So-Called Relative Truths”. He argued that the concept of relative truth is not acceptable. Twardowski’s paper became one of the most influential contributions in contemporary Polish philosophy. For instance, it initiated a discussion between Kotarbiński and Leśniewski concerning the temporality of truth. According to the latter, truth is eternal as well as sempiternal, but Kotarbiński accepted only eternality (what is true now, is true for ever, but not since ever) – the same position was taken by Łukasiewicz in his many-valued logic. Leśniewski pointed out that the proper absolutism must accept his position, but Kotarbiński’s approach implies a kind of relativism (the latter changed his mind after criticism of the former). An important outcome of the entire discussion consisted in clarification that absolutism is closely related to the principle of bivalence.
When Tarski formulated his semantic definition of truth (SDT for brevity), the question of its relation to absolutism and relativism immediately arose. For the first sight, SDT as relativised to a language L and a model M (the second relativisation was later introduced) appeared as relative. This issue was carefully examined by Maria Kokoszyńska in a series of papers published before 1939 and after 1945. She combined ideas of Twardowski and Tarski as well as defended SDT as an absolute definition of truth. According to Kokoszyńska, SDT is a good formalization of the absolute concept of truth. Looking at the problem from the contemporary perspective, one can see that SDT implies bivalence. In other words, if a sentence A expressed in a language L is true in a model M under Tarski’s definition (A is true iff A is satisfied by all infinite sequences of objects), this assertion entails bivalence (A is true or false in M).
Sekcja Gości Zagranicznych/Foreign Guest SectionPrzewodnicząca Sekcji: dr hab. Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, prof. KUL
Sekretarz Sekcji: mgr Marcin Grabowski (KUL)